Azalea (K25)

For the next five years she performed the unglamorous but essential work for which the Flower class had been designed: escorting merchant ships, protecting convoys, conducting anti-submarine patrols and supporting Allied operations at sea.

Her career took her from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and back to the waters around Britain. She survived the war, including one of its most tragic episodes, the German attack on Exercise Tiger in Lyme Bay on 28th April 1944.

That night, Azalea was the sole escort of Convoy T-4 when German E-boats attacked eight American Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs) taking part in the rehearsal for the Normandy invasion. Two LSTs were sunk and a third was badly damaged. 631 American soldiers and sailors died aboard the three affected ships.²

The story of Azalea is therefore inseparable from the wider history of the Atlantic convoy war, the preparation for D-Day and the men who served aboard the small escort vessels on which so much of Allied maritime operations depended.

1. Building a wartime escort

The Flower-class corvettes were conceived as relatively simple, economical escort vessels which could be built by commercial shipyards rather than specialised naval yards.

Their design owed much to the practical characteristics of a whale-catcher: a relatively small hull, good seakeeping qualities and machinery capable of sustained operation.

They were never intended to stand in the line of battle against major warships.

Their enemy was the submarine.

By 1939, German U-boats posed a serious threat to Britain’s survival. Britain depended upon imported food, fuel, raw materials and manufactured goods, while troops and equipment also had to be transported across the Atlantic.

A ship such as Azalea was therefore part of a vast defensive system whose purpose was simple: keep the merchant ships moving.

Azalea was ordered on 25th July 1939 and laid down on 15 November that year at Cook, Welton & Gemmell in Beverley, Yorkshire. She was launched on 8th July 1940 and commissioned into the Royal Navy on 27th January 1941.¹

Her early commanding officer was Lieutenant George Carlow Geddes, RNR, who is recorded as having taken command on 6th November 1940 and remained associated with the ship until the middle of 1945.³

2. The ship

As built, Azalea was a comparatively small warship.

The Flower class was approximately 205 feet (62.5 metres) long, with a beam of about 33 feet (10.1 metres). The ships displaced roughly 950 tons in their original configuration and were capable of about 16 knots.

Their armament varied during the war as new weapons and equipment were fitted, but the principal anti-submarine weapon was the depth charge. Anti-aircraft armament was progressively increased as the threat from aircraft became more significant.

A Flower-class corvette was not a comfortable ship.

The hull was small for the number of men required to operate her, and the North Atlantic could make life aboard extremely arduous. Noise, vibration, cold, spray and the constant movement of the ship were simply part of the job.

The crew worked watches around the clock. Even when no enemy was visible, the possibility of a submarine attack remained.

The ship’s apparent modesty concealed an important responsibility.

If an escort did its job successfully, nothing necessarily happened.

The convoy arrived. The merchant ships unloaded. The escort turned around and went back to sea.

That absence of drama was itself a measure of success.

3. Into the Atlantic war

Azalea began her operational career in 1941.

The surviving convoy records provide a remarkably useful outline of her movements. They show her joining OG 55 in March 1941, followed by HG 58, HG 61, OG 61, OG 63, HG 66, OG 68 and OS 1, among other Atlantic convoy movements during her first year of service.⁴

The abbreviations themselves tell something of the geography of the war.

OG convoys travelled from Britain towards Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. HG convoys travelled in the opposite direction. OS convoys carried shipping southwards towards West Africa and beyond, while SL convoys brought shipping northwards.

The work was therefore not confined to the waters immediately around Britain.

Azalea and ships like her were components in a maritime network stretching from British ports across the Atlantic to Gibraltar, Freetown and the Mediterranean.

4. Escort duty

Convoy escort was a strange form of warfare.

The escort had to maintain station with merchant ships travelling at a deliberately controlled speed. It had to search for submarines while avoiding unnecessary manoeuvres that might disrupt the convoy.

An escort could spend days at sea without seeing an enemy.

Then a submarine contact could change everything.

The escort would break away from the convoy, investigate the contact, attack if appropriate and then attempt to regain station.

The sea itself was an additional adversary.

A Flower-class corvette was small enough for heavy weather to have a profound effect upon the ship and her crew. In the North Atlantic, cold, exhaustion and seasickness could become serious hazards even without enemy action.

The records of Azalea‘s service consequently consist largely of convoy movements rather than spectacular battles.

That should not be mistaken for inactivity.

Convoy escort was continuous operational work.

5. 1941 — Atlantic and Gibraltar

The convoy records show Azalea operating extensively during 1941.

Among the documented movements were OG 55, HG 58, HG 61, OG 61, OG 63, HG 66, OG 68 and OS 1.⁴

Her association with Gibraltar was particularly important.

>The Mediterranean was a strategic artery for the British Empire and Allied forces. Gibraltar was the western gateway to that sea, and the convoys passing through it were vital to the survival of British forces in North Africa and the wider Mediterranean theatre.

The detailed operational record also records anti-submarine exercises involving Azalea and other Allied vessels off Gibraltar during 1941.³

This was the practical side of the escort war: ships trained together, practised detecting submarines and refined procedures before being required to use them in combat.

6. 1942–43 — expanding responsibilities

The surviving escort records show Azalea continuing to undertake convoy work during 1942 and 1943.

Her documented movements included OS 32, BX 30B, KMF 3, TE 7A, MKS 3X, MKS 3Y, KMS 7G, MKS 6, ON 174 and HX 232.⁴

The variety of these convoy designations illustrates how widely her duties ranged.

Some movements were associated with the Atlantic approaches; others were connected with the Mediterranean and North African campaigns.

By 1943, the strategic balance of the war was changing.

The Allies had gained increasing control of the Atlantic, while the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa opened the way towards Sicily and Italy.

But shipping still had to move.

An escort vessel remained essential.

7. A veteran escort

By the beginning of 1944, Azalea was no longer a new ship.

She had spent several years at sea and had accumulated considerable experience of convoy operations.

The convoy record shows her undertaking WP SP 24 in March 1944 and WP SP 26 at the end of that month.⁴

These were British coastal convoy movements, reflecting a change in the nature of her duties as preparations for the invasion of Europe accelerated.

The Allies were now assembling an enormous force in southern England.

Men, vehicles, fuel, ammunition, engineering equipment and food were being moved towards the ports from which the Normandy invasion would be launched.

Every part of the maritime system had to work.

8. Exercise Tiger

Preparing for D-Day

The Normandy landings required an extraordinary degree of preparation.

The Allies had to practise loading troops, assembling convoys, approaching beaches and coordinating naval and military forces on a scale that had never previously been attempted.

In Devon, Slapton Sands was selected as a training area because its beaches and surrounding terrain were considered sufficiently similar to the intended American landing area at Utah Beach.⁵

Exercise Tiger was one of the largest rehearsals.

It was not a small demonstration.

Thousands of American servicemen were involved, together with landing ships, landing craft and supporting naval forces.

The exercise was intended to reproduce many of the conditions of the real invasion.

And, as the events of 28th April demonstrated, the enemy remained capable of appearing even during training.

9. Convoy T-4

During the night of 27–28th April 1944, eight American LSTs formed Convoy T-4.

Five had sailed from Plymouth:

• USS LST-515
• USS LST-496
• USS LST-511
• USS LST-531
• USS LST-58

Three came from Brixham:

• USS LST-499
• USS LST-289
• USS LST-507

The two sections joined and proceeded in a single column at approximately six knots, with HMS Azalea as escort.⁶

The original plan called for two British escorts.

The second was HMS Scimitar, a destroyer.

But Scimitar was damaged in a collision with an American landing craft and could not continue with the convoy. A replacement, HMS Saladin, was sent, but she did not reach T-4 before the attack.⁶

Thus, as the convoy entered Lyme Bay, Azalea was effectively alone.

Her commanding officer was Lieutenant Commander George C. Geddes.

10. The German force

At the same time, German naval forces were active in the Channel.

Nine German Schnellboote — fast attack craft known to the Allies as E-boats — sailed from Cherbourg.

These vessels were exceptionally fast compared with the lumbering LSTs.

They carried torpedoes and guns and were designed to make precisely the sort of high-speed attack for which the convoy was poorly prepared.⁶

The German boats encountered Convoy T-4 in Lyme Bay.

The resulting engagement turned an invasion rehearsal into a genuine naval battle.

11. Communications

One of the most important elements of the Exercise Tiger story was the breakdown in communications.

Warnings of German activity had been generated within the Allied system.

But those warnings did not reach the convoy in an effective manner.

The LSTs were not monitoring the same British radio frequency, while radio-silence requirements complicated the exchange of information.⁷

The significance of this cannot be overstated.

The convoy was operating under the assumption that its escort and supporting authorities possessed a common picture of the tactical situation.

They did not.

The U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command records that Azalea‘s commander believed that the LSTs had received information about the German boats which, in reality, they had not received.⁷

This is one reason why the events should not be reduced to the simple assertion that Azalea was warned and then failed to warn the convoy.

The surviving evidence points instead to a chain of failures and assumptions.

12. The attack

At approximately 0204 on 28th April 1944, the German attack began.

USS LST-507, near the rear of the column, was struck by a torpedo.

The ship caught fire and began to sink.

Men abandoned ship in darkness.

The conditions were terrible.

There was confusion aboard the burning vessel, while the surrounding sea was dark and extremely cold.

A contemporary U.S. report subsequently recorded the attack as occurring at approximately 0204, giving the position as 50°07′ N, 2°50′ W.⁸

A survivor’s later account places the torpedo strike at approximately 0203.⁹

The one-minute difference is a useful illustration of why this history should distinguish between records and recollections.

Both are valuable.

Neither should automatically be treated as more precise than the surviving evidence permits.

13. USS LST-531

Within minutes, USS LST-531 was also struck.

The ship sank rapidly.

The men aboard were confronted by the same combination of dangers: the initial explosion, darkness, fire, cold water and the difficulty of escaping from a large vessel in an unexpected night attack.

The U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command records that LST-531 sank in approximately six minutes.⁶

For many aboard, there was almost no time to organise an orderly abandonment.

14. USS LST-289

A third LST, USS LST-289, was also attacked.

Unlike LST-507 and LST-531, she survived.

She was hit by a torpedo in the stern and suffered severe damage but managed to reach port.⁶

The official U.S. Navy account records that LST-289 opened fire on the attacking E-boats.

The remaining LSTs and subsequently arriving British destroyers also engaged the Germans, who used their speed and smoke to withdraw.⁶

The German boats escaped.

15. What was HMS Azalea doing?

This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the entire story.

Azalea was the convoy’s only escort.

Yet she did not prevent the initial attack, and she did not destroy any of the German boats.

Later accounts have consequently scrutinised the actions of her commanding officer.

The historical evidence, however, deserves careful treatment.

The official U.S. Navy account states that Azalea reversed course after the attack began, but that the direction of the German attack was unclear.⁷

There was also a difficult decision over illumination.

Firing illumination rounds might have revealed the attacking boats.

But illuminating the sea could also have silhouetted the LSTs, making the much larger and slower landing ships easier targets.

Geddes decided not to illuminate the convoy.⁷

It is possible to criticise that decision with the benefit of hindsight.

It is much harder to know what the correct decision was in the darkness, amid an attack whose direction was uncertain, with incomplete information and a convoy that had already lost one of its two escorts.

A historical account should therefore record the decision and its consequences without turning hindsight into certainty.

16. The human cost

The attack killed 631 American soldiers and sailors aboard the three affected LSTs, according to Historic England.⁵

The Exercise Tiger Trust records 639 deaths and maintains a detailed Roll of Honour containing the names of those who died.¹⁰

These men were not all combat infantry.

The LSTs carried a mixture of Army and Navy personnel, including engineers, transport personnel, communications specialists, medical personnel and other support units.

Their work was essential to the invasion.

The men who died at sea were preparing to help sustain the Allied forces after they reached Normandy.

Many never saw France.

17. The cold water

For the survivors, the danger did not end when they left the ships.

The water of Lyme Bay in April was extremely cold.

Survivors faced immersion, exhaustion and hypothermia.

Later testimony describes men struggling with flotation equipment and attempting to stay alive in the water while ships burned around them.

The recollections preserved by the Exercise Tiger Trust provide a human dimension which cannot be obtained from the official operational reports alone.⁹

Such recollections must, however, be identified for what they are: memories recorded after the event.

They are invaluable evidence of individual experience, but they do not necessarily establish the exact timing or sequence of every event.

18. The official report

A U.S. Army report dated 30th April 1944 recorded that at approximately 0204 on 28th April a convoy of eight LSTs was attacked in Lyme Bay.

It stated that LST-507 and LST-531 were sunk and that other LSTs were hit but managed to reach port.⁸

This document is particularly important because it is a wartime record produced immediately after the event rather than a later historical reconstruction.

It does not, however, answer every question.

That is why the modern historical record benefits from being assembled from several categories of evidence:

• contemporary military reports;
• naval records;
• convoy records;
• German accounts;
• survivor statements;
• photographs;
• later historical research;
• and archaeological evidence from the wrecks.

The Exercise Tiger Trust has brought many of these materials together in its digital archive.¹¹

19. The secrecy surrounding Exercise Tiger

The disaster was not publicly discussed in the way a peacetime maritime accident would have been.

That was hardly surprising.

The Allies were preparing an invasion of occupied Europe.

Publicly revealing that a major rehearsal had been attacked by German forces, and that hundreds of American servicemen had died, could have provided the Germans with valuable intelligence.

The men involved were therefore often left without the public recognition that would normally accompany a disaster of such magnitude.

For decades Exercise Tiger remained comparatively obscure.

The subsequent preservation of documents, photographs and survivor testimony has allowed historians to reconstruct the event in increasing detail.

20. After Exercise Tiger

The tragedy did not end Azalea‘s wartime career.

The surviving convoy records show her returning to active duties after the April disaster.

In June 1944 she is recorded with EBC 15, followed later that month by EBC 25.⁴

The significance of these movements is considerable.

By then, D-Day had taken place.

The rehearsal had become reality.

The Channel was now carrying an enormous flow of Allied reinforcements, equipment and supplies towards Normandy.

The escort vessels that had rehearsed the invasion were now helping sustain the actual campaign.

Azalea continued to perform the same fundamental task she had undertaken since 1941: protecting ships at sea.

21. The final months of the war

The surviving convoy records provide a framework for reconstructing Azalea’s operational career, but they do not constitute a complete ship’s log.

This distinction is important.

A convoy database can establish when Azalea joined and left a particular convoy.

It cannot necessarily tell us everything she did during periods for which a detailed log or other primary record has not survived or has not yet been located.

Accordingly, this history deliberately avoids inventing a continuous narrative for periods where the documentary evidence is incomplete.

What can be established is that Azalea survived the European war and remained in Royal Navy service until the post-war reduction of the fleet.

22. The end of her Royal Navy career

The war transformed the Royal Navy.

Hundreds of wartime escorts were no longer required once the German submarine threat had disappeared.

Azalea was sold out of Royal Navy service on 5th April 1946. She subsequently entered merchant service under the name Norte.¹

Her transformation from a Royal Navy escort into a civilian vessel was part of the enormous post-war demobilisation of the wartime fleet.

The little corvette that had escorted Atlantic convoys and survived Exercise Tiger was now a merchant ship.

23. Norte

The post-war history of Azalea is less well documented in readily accessible sources than her Royal Navy career.

This is an area where further archival research would be particularly valuable.

What can presently be established with confidence is that the former Azalea entered merchant service as Norte after her sale in 1946 and remained in civilian service until her loss on 19th January 1955.¹

The details of her ownership, voyages and the precise circumstances surrounding her final loss deserve further investigation before being presented as established fact.

This is an example of an important principle in historical writing: an incomplete record is better than a fabricated one.

24. A small ship in a very large war

HMS Azalea was never a famous capital ship.

She carried no heavy guns with which to challenge battleships.

Her speed was modest.

Her accommodation was cramped.

Her principal task was to escort ships which, in most circumstances, nobody would ever remember.

Yet, that was precisely why ships like Azalea mattered.

The Second World War at sea was not fought only by battleships and aircraft carriers.

It was also fought by thousands of sailors aboard corvettes, trawlers, destroyers, sloops and other escorts.

Their task was to keep the sea lanes open.

Every merchant ship which arrived safely represented food, fuel, ammunition, machinery or personnel delivered where they were needed.

Every convoy that reached its destination helped sustain the wider war effort.

25. Remembering 28th April 1944

The story of Azalea and Exercise Tiger should be approached with particular care.

It is tempting to reduce the events of 28th April to a single failure or to place responsibility upon one ship.

The surviving evidence does not support such a simple interpretation.

The convoy lost its second escort before sailing.

The replacement did not arrive in time.

Communications between the British escort and the American LSTs were inadequate.

Warnings about German activity did not reach all those who needed them.

The convoy was slow and vulnerable.

The German force was fast and heavily armed.

The attack took place in darkness.

And, once the first torpedo struck, events unfolded with extraordinary speed.

These factors form a chain.

Remove any one of them and the outcome might have been different; but history cannot reliably tell us what would have happened.

What it can tell us is what did happen.

At approximately two o’clock in the morning on 28th April 1944, German E-boats attacked Convoy T-4 in Lyme Bay.

Two LSTs were sunk.

A third was badly damaged.

639 American soldiers and sailors died.¹⁰

And HMS Azalea, the convoy’s lone escort, survived the action.² ⁵ ⁶

26. The legacy of HMS Azalea

The history of Azalea is ultimately a history of service rather than celebrity.

She represents the thousands of small Allied warships whose crews spent the war performing repetitive, dangerous duties far from the headlines.

Her career also connects several different chapters of the Second World War.

She was part of the Atlantic convoy system.

She served on Mediterranean-related routes.

She supported the Allied maritime build-up.

She became the sole escort of Convoy T-4 during Exercise Tiger.

And, after surviving that disaster, she returned to duty and continued her wartime service.

Her story therefore belongs not only to the history of the Royal Navy but also to the history of the men who crossed the Atlantic, the merchant seamen they protected, the American forces preparing for D-Day and the families who lost men in Lyme Bay.

HMS Azalea — principal particulars

• Type: Flower-class corvette
• Pennant: K25
• Builder: Cook, Welton & Gemmell, Beverley
• Ordered: 25th July 1939
• Laid down: 15th November 1939
• Launched: 8th July 1940
• Commissioned: 27th January 1941
• Length: 205 ft (62.5 m)
• Beam: 33 ft (10.1 m)
• Propulsion: Steam reciprocating machinery
• Speed: approximately 16 knots
• Primary role: Convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare
• Commanding officer associated with Exercise Tiger: Lt Cdr George C. Geddes, RNR
• Armament: Naval gun, anti-aircraft weapons, and depth charges
• Crew: Approximately 80–90 officers and ratings
• Sold from Royal Navy: 5th April 1946
• Merchant name: Norte
• Lost: 19th January 1955

Chronology

• 25th July 1939 — Azalea ordered.¹
• 15th November 1939 — Laid down at Cook, Welton & Gemmell, Beverley.¹
• 8th July 1940 — Launched.¹
• 27th January 1941 — Commissioned into the Royal Navy.¹
• March 1941 — Recorded with Atlantic convoy OG 55.⁴
• April–August 1941 — Multiple Atlantic convoy duties, including HG 58, HG 61, OG 61, OG 63, HG 66, OG 68 and OS 1.⁴
• 1942–43 — Continued Atlantic and Mediterranean-related convoy service.⁴
• March 1944 — Recorded with WP SP 24 and WP SP 26.⁴
• 27th–28th April 1944 — Exercise Tiger; Azalea escorts Convoy T-4 in Lyme Bay.⁶
• 28th April 1944 — German E-boats attack. LST-507 and LST-531 are sunk; LST-289 is severely damaged. 639 men die aboard the three ships.² ⁵
• June 1944 — Azalea recorded with EBC 15 and EBC 25.⁴
• 1945 — Remains in Royal Navy service until the end of the European war.¹
• 5th April 1946 — Sold from Royal Navy service.¹
• 1946 onwards — Enters merchant service as Norte.¹
• 19th January 1955 — Norte, formerly HMS Azalea, is lost.¹