HMS AZALEA (K25)

Life & Service Timeline

Ship’s Life & Service Timeline, 1939–1955

Evidence key

[C] Contemporary record — a wartime document, report, log or other record produced at or close to the time.

[O] Official or institutional historical record — material subsequently compiled or published by a recognised naval, government or heritage institution.

[R] Recollection — a survivor statement, memoir, interview or other personal account recorded after the event.

[H] Later historical research — specialist reconstruction or research based upon surviving evidence.

[?] Uncertain — the available evidence does not establish the matter conclusively.

The numbered references at the end of the timeline identify the source for each entry.

1939

25th July 1939 — Ordered

HMS Azalea is ordered for the Royal Navy. [H]

The order is placed during the rapid expansion of Britain’s naval forces as the international situation deteriorates.

The Flower-class corvettes are intended to provide relatively inexpensive escort vessels which can be constructed by commercial shipyards.

The design will ultimately prove particularly valuable in the Battle of the Atlantic, where Britain needs large numbers of escorts rather than a small number of large warships.

Source: [1]
15th November 1939 — Keel laid

The keel of Azalea is laid at Cook, Welton & Gemmell, Beverley, Yorkshire. [H]

The ship is being constructed only a few weeks after the outbreak of the Second World War.

The yard is one of several commercial shipbuilders contributing to the rapid expansion of Britain’s escort fleet.

Source: [1]
1940

8th July 1940 — Launched

Azalea is launched at Beverley. [H]

Britain is now fighting Germany alone in Western Europe following the fall of France.

The Battle of the Atlantic is becoming increasingly important, and the need for escort vessels is urgent.

Source: [1]
Late 1940 — Fitting out and preparation for service

During the second half of 1940, Azalea is fitted out and prepared for Royal Navy service.

Lieutenant George Carlow Geddes, RNR, is recorded as becoming her commanding officer on 6th November 1940. [H]

Source: [1]
1941

27th January 1941 — Commissioned

Azalea is commissioned into the Royal Navy with the pennant K25. [H]

She enters service at a particularly dangerous stage of the Atlantic war.

Her principal role is convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare.

Source: [1]
February 1941 — Anti-submarine exercises off Tobermory

Azalea takes part in anti-submarine exercises off Tobermory, operating with other escort vessels and the submarine HMS H50. [C/H]

Records for 17th, 18th, 20th and 22nd February document exercises involving Azalea and other ships.

These exercises are an important reminder that a newly commissioned corvette’s first months are not simply spent escorting convoys. Crews must learn to operate together and practise detecting and attacking submarines before entering sustained operational service.

Source: [1]
7th March 1941 — Convoy OG 55

Azalea joins Convoy OG 55 as an escort. [H]

She remains with the convoy until 21st March.

OG convoys travel from Britain towards Gibraltar and the Mediterranean approaches.

Source: [2]
3rd April 1941 — Convoy HG 58

Azalea joins Convoy HG 58 at Gibraltar. [H]

HG convoys are the westbound counterpart to OG convoys, carrying shipping towards Britain.

The convoy consists of a large number of merchant vessels and is protected by several escorts.

Source: [2]
10th–18th April 1941 — HG 58

The convoy proceeds northwards.

On 10th April, Azalea and HMS Fleur de Lys part company temporarily to rendezvous with HMS Coreopsis. [C/H]

During the passage, other naval forces join the convoy.

On 18th April, Azalea eventually leaves the convoy to proceed towards Gibraltar. [H]

Source: [1]
12th April 1941 — Siboney incident

A separate incident occurs during Azalea‘s early Atlantic service.

The U.S.-flagged passenger liner SS Siboney is challenged by British escort vessels.

Later accounts state that Azalea and another escort fired a warning shot and questioned the American vessel’s master before allowing Siboney to continue. [H]

This was a period of heightened suspicion concerning neutral and potentially enemy-controlled shipping.

Source: [3]

Note: the precise circumstances and division of responsibility between the British vessels are better treated as a separate research subject than as a central part of Azalea’s career.
6th May 1941 — Convoy OG 61

Azalea joins Convoy OG 61. [H]

The convoy has been assembled from several British ports and is proceeding towards Gibraltar.

The convoy record demonstrates the complexity of wartime shipping: different groups of merchant vessels join and leave at different points, while escorts are detached and reassigned according to operational requirements.

Source: [2]
14th–18th May 1941 — OG 61

On 14th May, Azalea joins the convoy together with HMS Geranium and HMS Jonquil. [H]

On 18th May she leaves the convoy and proceeds towards Gibraltar.

Source: [1]
25th May 1941 — Convoy OG 63

Azalea joins Convoy OG 63. [H]

The convoy consists of merchant ships assembled from several British ports.

Source: [2]
24th June 1941 — Convoy HG 66

Azalea joins Convoy HG 66 at Gibraltar. [H]

The convoy includes a substantial number of merchant vessels and several naval escorts.

Source: [2]
1st July 1941 — HG 66 / OG 66

Azalea is recorded leaving HG 66 and joining OG 66. [H]

This illustrates the continuous cycle of escort work undertaken by the smaller warships: rather than returning home after a single convoy, an escort might be reassigned to another formation.

Source: [1]
July 1941 — Atlantic convoy service

Azalea continues escort work through July, including OG 68 and OS 1. [H]

The convoy record shows her operating repeatedly between Britain, Gibraltar and the wider Atlantic routes.

Source: [2]
September 1941 — Anti-submarine exercises off Gibraltar

On 16th September, Azalea takes part in anti-submarine exercises off Gibraltar with HMS Severn and HMS Lord Hotham. [C/H]

On 18th September, further exercises are recorded with HMS Severn and HMS Fleur de Lys. [C/H]

The exercises demonstrate the importance attached to submarine detection and escort coordination.

Source: [1]
November 1941 — SL 91G / SL 91G1

Azalea is recorded with SL 91G and subsequently SL 91G1. [H]

These convoys are part of the long-distance Atlantic supply system.

Source: [2]
1942

21st June 1942 — OS 32

Azalea joins Convoy OS 32. [H]

The convoy route forms part of the Atlantic supply chain towards West Africa.

Source: [2]
25th July 1942 — BX 30B

Azalea joins Convoy BX 30B. [H]

This is another example of the changing nature of her escort work as Allied shipping routes adapt to wartime circumstances.

Source: [2]
14th November 1942 — KMF 3

Azalea joins Convoy KMF 3. [H]
KMF convoys are associated with the movement of Allied forces and supplies towards the Mediterranean.

The convoy system is now supporting the Allied campaign in North Africa.

Source: [2]
29th November 1942 — TE 7A

Azalea joins Convoy TE 7A. [H]
The convoy record does not provide a complete arrival/departure sequence for Azalea on this movement.

Source: [2]

Evidence note: The convoy record marks some details as unknown. They are therefore deliberately not reconstructed here.
3rd–23rd December 1942 — MKS 3X / MKS 3Y

Azalea is recorded with MKS 3X and MKS 3Y. [H]
MKS convoys are Mediterranean-bound or Mediterranean-return shipping formations associated with the Allied supply system.

Source: [2]
1943

January–February 1943 — Mediterranean convoy service

Azalea continues Mediterranean convoy work.

She is recorded with KMS 7G and subsequently MKS 6. [H]

Source: [2]
20th March 1943 — ON 174

Azalea joins Convoy ON 174. [H]
ON convoys are eastbound Atlantic convoys travelling towards Britain.

Source: [2]
1st April 1943 — HX 232

Azalea joins Convoy HX 232. [H]
HX convoys are among the principal North Atlantic convoy series.

Source: [2]
May–October 1943 — Atlantic convoy cycle
During the remainder of 1943, Azalea is recorded with:
[H]

HX convoys are among the principal North Atlantic convoy series.

Source: [2]
1944

15th March 1944 — WP SP 24

Azalea joins WP SP 24. [H]

The convoy movement is a British coastal operation rather than one of the long-distance Atlantic convoys which had dominated much of her earlier career.

Source: [2]
31st March 1944 — WP SP 26

Azalea joins WP SP 26. [H]

She leaves the convoy on 2nd April.

Source: [2]
April 1944

Exercise Tiger

The setting

By April 1944, southern England has become an enormous military staging area.

The Allies are preparing for the invasion of Normandy.

At Slapton Sands, Devon, the U.S. Army’s Force U is rehearsing the landings that will eventually take place at Utah Beach.

Exercise Tiger is a full-scale exercise rather than a simple training demonstration.

Thousands of men and large quantities of equipment are involved.

Source: [4][5]
27th April 1944

Convoy T-4 assembles
The setting

Eight American LSTs form Convoy T-4.

Five load at Plymouth:
Three join from Brixham:
[C/O]
The convoy is placed under the command of U.S. Navy Commander Bernard Skahill.

HMS Azalea is one of the British escorts.

The other is HMS Scimitar. [O]

Source: [4][5]
HMS Scimitar is lost from the escort

Before the convoy can proceed as originally planned, Scimitar is involved in a collision and must return to port.

HMS Saladin is sent as a replacement.

She does not reach Convoy T-4 before the attack. [O]

Consequently, Azalea becomes the sole escort accompanying the eight LSTs into Lyme Bay.

Source: [5]
Radio communications

The convoy is operating under strict radio procedures.

A communications problem means that the American LSTs are not monitoring the same British radio frequency as the shore authorities.

This becomes critically important because British stations subsequently detect German S-boats approaching from the direction of Cherbourg.

The convoy does not receive the warning in the normal way. [O]

Source: [5]
Night of 27th–28th April 1944

German S-boats depart Cherbourg

A force of nine German Schnellboote leaves Cherbourg under the command of Korvettenkapitän Bernd Klug.

The Allied designation for these vessels is “E-boats”. [O]

Their speed gives them a major tactical advantage over the slow LSTs.

Source: [5]
28th April 1944

Shortly after 0100 — First indication of danger

[R] Survivor recollection

A later statement by Lieutenant J. F. Murdock of LST-507 records hearing a scraping noise beneath the ship shortly after 0100.

He believed that a torpedo may have passed underneath the vessel.

Tracer fire was subsequently seen.

General quarters was ordered.

But the men aboard the ship still believed that what they were experiencing might be part of the exercise.

Source: [6]

Evidence note: This is a recollection recorded after the event. It is therefore kept separate from the contemporary operational record.
Approximately 0200 — The attack develops

The German boats have manoeuvred around the rear of the convoy.

The LSTs are proceeding in a long, slow column.

Azalea is ahead of them.

The German boats attack from astern.

The official U.S. Navy historical account states that the attacking boats had remained undetected by both Azalea and the LSTs until the attack developed. [O]

Source: [5]
Approximately 0204–0207 — USS LST-507 torpedoed

[C] Contemporary report

A U.S. wartime report dated 30th April 1944 gives the time of the first torpedo attack as 0204.

It records that LST-507 was struck first, followed by a second torpedo, and that LST-531 was subsequently hit. [C]

Source: [7]
[O] Later U.S. Navy reconstruction

The U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command’s later reconstruction places the devastating hit on LST-507 at approximately 0207. [O]

The torpedo strikes the ship amidships in the vicinity of the auxiliary machinery space.

Power and communications are knocked out.

Fuel and vehicles carried aboard contribute to a severe fire.

Source: [5]

Evidence note: The difference between 0204 in the contemporary report and approximately 0207 in the later reconstruction is retained rather than silently resolved.
Approximately 0218 — USS LST-531 struck

The U.S. Navy’s later reconstruction records LST-531 being struck approximately eleven minutes after the devastating hit on LST-507. [O

Two torpedoes strike in rapid succession.

LST-531 sinks in approximately six minutes.

Source: [5]
USS LST-289 attacked

Lieutenant Henry A. Mettler, commanding LST-289, sees incoming torpedoes and orders the ship to manoeuvre.

The ship avoids a direct broadside hit but is struck in the stern.

The stern section is badly damaged and eventually separates from the main body of the ship.

The forward portion survives.

Hundreds of men therefore avoid being thrown into the water. [O]

Source: [5]
The response of HMS Azalea

Azalea reverses course

As the LSTs at the rear of the convoy come under attack, Azalea reverses course.

But the direction of the German attack is not immediately clear.

The corvette cannot establish effective communication with the LSTs. [O]

Source: [5]
The illumination decision

Commander George C. Geddes faces a difficult tactical choice.

Illumination rounds might reveal the German attackers.

But they might also illuminate and silhouette the LSTs, making the much larger ships easier targets.

The U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command records that Geddes did not launch illumination rounds for this reason. [O]

Source: [5]
Azalea does not fire

The surviving official historical account records that Azalea never obtains an opportunity to fire upon the German S-boats.

Her lack of speed means that she could not realistically chase down the attackers once they had completed their torpedo run. [O]

Source: [5]

This fact has subsequently attracted criticism in some accounts.

The documentary evidence, however, records the tactical circumstances rather than establishing a simple explanation of blame.
The convoy breaks up

The attack causes confusion among the LSTs.

Some ships open fire in the darkness.

There is a serious danger of friendly fire.

Commander Skahill orders the convoy to scatter and return to port. [O]

Source: [5]
Rescue operations

USS LST-515

LST-515 returns towards the scene and begins rescuing survivors.

The contemporary report records survivors remaining in the water for between approximately three and a half and five hours. [C]

Source: [7]
The condition of survivors

The same contemporary report notes that many survivors were suffering from shock and exposure.

It records that some recovered bodies were not wearing life preservers correctly, while others had not inflated them. [C]

This observation is significant but should be read in the context of the report: the men had experienced a sudden night-time torpedo attack, and the Army personnel aboard had not necessarily received the same training in naval life-saving equipment as experienced naval crews.

Source: [7]
28th April 1944 — Morning

The surviving vessels make their way back towards port.

The German boats escape.

The official contemporary report states that there were no known German casualties or damage as a result of the engagement. [C]

Source: [7]
The human cost

631 or 639 dead

Historic England records 631 soldiers and sailors killed aboard the three affected LSTs.

The Exercise Tiger Trust records 639 deaths and maintains a detailed Roll of Honour. [O]

Source: [8][9]
After the attack

Statements are gathered

Survivors are questioned and reports are prepared.

Some accounts are produced immediately.

Others are recorded years or decades later.

The surviving Exercise Tiger archive therefore contains several different kinds of evidence: contemporary military reports, declassified documents, survivor statements, newspaper reports and later historical research. [O]

Source: [10]
Why the disaster remained secret

Statements are gathered

The Allies were preparing for the Normandy invasion.

The loss of hundreds of American servicemen during a rehearsal was therefore highly sensitive information.

The disaster was not publicly discussed in anything approaching the detail that would normally follow a maritime catastrophe.

The secrecy contributed to Exercise Tiger remaining obscure for many years.

Source: [5][10]
June 1944

18th June — EBC 15

After D-Day, Azalea is recorded escorting EBC 15. [H]

The nature of her work has now changed.

The invasion is no longer being rehearsed.

The Allied armies are in Normandy, and the Channel has become a vast supply route.

Source: [2]
28th June — EBC 25

Azalea joins EBC 25.

She leaves the convoy on 3th0 June. [H]

The movement demonstrates that, despite the tragedy of Exercise Tiger, she returned to active escort duty.

Source: [2]
Summer 1944 onwards

The readily accessible convoy movement record becomes less complete after June 1944.

Rather than filling the gaps with assumptions, this timeline deliberately records only movements which can currently be established from the cited convoy record.

Evidence status [?]: Further research into Admiralty movement records, ship’s logs and operational reports could potentially fill these gaps.
1945

End of European war

Azalea survives the European war.

The precise sequence of her duties during the final months requires further archival reconstruction.

Her commanding officer, George C. Geddes, remains listed with the ship until approximately mid-1945. [H]

Source: [1]
5th April 1946

Sold from Royal Navy service

The wartime career of HMS Azalea formally comes to an end.

She is sold out of Royal Navy service. [H]

The former corvette subsequently enters merchant service under the name Norte.

Source: [1]
1946–1954

Norte

The former Azalea continues her life as a merchant vessel.

The readily accessible documentary record for this period is considerably thinner than that for her Royal Navy service.

Consequently, this period should currently be regarded as an open research section rather than reconstructed from secondary material of uncertain provenance.

Evidence status: [?] [1] A future version of the timeline should ideally incorporate Lloyd’s Register entries, Board of Trade records, merchant shipping registers and contemporary shipping newspapers.
19th January 1955

The loss of Norte

The former Azalea, now sailing as the merchant vessel Norte, is recorded as being lost at sea on 19th January 1955. [H]

The date of loss is established in the available ship references.

The precise circumstances of her final loss require further documentary investigation before a detailed account should be published.

Source: [1]
After 1955

Remembering HMS Azalea

The ship disappeared from the sea, but her history did not.

Interest in Exercise Tiger gradually increased, particularly as survivors and researchers began to make more information available.

The development of dedicated archives has allowed the story to be reconstructed from documents that were once difficult for researchers to access.

The Exercise Tiger Trust now maintains an extensive online archive containing contemporary documents, survivor accounts and later research. [O]

Source: [10]
A final note on the night of 28 April 1944

Remembering HMS Azalea

The surviving evidence allows us to establish the broad sequence with considerable confidence.

Convoy T-4 consisted of eight LSTs.

Scimitar, the planned second escort, was lost from the formation before the attack.

Saladin was dispatched but arrived too late.

Azalea remained as the sole escort.

German S-boats approached from Cherbourg.

Warnings did not reach the convoy effectively.

The attack came from astern.

LST-507 and LST-531 were sunk.

LST-289 was badly damaged but survived.

Azalea reversed course but could not establish the direction of the attack and did not fire upon the German boats.

The German force escaped.

Hundreds of men died in the water.

These facts are supported by the contemporary and official record.

What cannot be established with the same certainty is what every individual aboard each ship believed at every moment.

That is where recollections become important, and where they must be labelled as recollections.

The difference between the two is not a weakness in the historical record.

It is the history.

Sources

[1] Uboat.net — HMS Azalea (K25)

Type: Specialist naval reference / compiled historical record.

Contains Azalea‘s construction details, commissioning, commanding officer information, sale in 1946 and loss in 1955, together with numerous operational events.

Uboat.net — HMS Azalea (K25)

[2] Naval-History.net — British Escort Movements, Flower-class Corvettes

Type: Compiled convoy movement research.

Particularly useful for establishing the dates on which Azalea joined and left individual convoys. The source lists movements from OG 55 in March 1941 through EBC 25 in June 1944.

Naval-History.net — Flower-class escort movements

[3] Uboat.net — Azalea operational record

Type: Compiled naval research based on wartime records.

The individual ship history contains detailed entries for Azalea‘s convoy operations, including HG 58, OG 61, HG 66 and her anti-submarine exercises.

[4] U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command — Exercise Tiger

Type: Official U.S. Navy historical record. naval research based on wartime records.

Provides the broad context of Exercise Tiger, the intended Utah Beach rehearsal and the organisation of Convoy T-4.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command — Exercise Tiger

[5] U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command — H-Gram 029

Type: Official U.S. Navy historical analysis.

This is the principal source for the detailed reconstruction of the night of 27th–28th April 1944, including the nine German S-boats, the loss of Scimitar, the radio-frequency problem, the attacks on the LSTs and the actions of Azalea and Commander Geddes.

H-Gram 029 — The Exercise Tiger Debacle

[6] Exercise Tiger Trust — Lieutenant J. F. Murdock statement

Type: Personal recollection / survivor testimony.

The statement provides a participant’s recollection of the opening stages of the attack, including the reported scraping sound, tracer fire and torpedo strike against LST-507.

Exercise Tiger Trust — J. F. Murdock debriefing archive

[7] Exercise Tiger Trust — Declassified Report, 30th April 1944

Type: Contemporary wartime military report.

The report is dated 30th April 1944 and records the attack at 0204, the loss of LST-507 and LST-531, the attempted rescue operation and the condition of survivors.

Exercise Tiger Trust — Declassified Report, 30th April 1944

[8] Historic England — Exercise Tiger

Type: National heritage organisation / historical research.

Provides the British heritage perspective on Exercise Tiger, including the Slapton Sands training area, Convoy T-4 and the casualty figure of 631.

Historic England — Exercise Tiger collection

[9] Exercise Tiger Trust — Roll of Honour

Type: Memorial and research resource.

Provides the names of those recorded as having died during the Exercise Tiger disaster.

Exercise Tiger Trust — Roll of Honour

[10] Exercise Tiger Trust — Document Archive

Type: Specialist historical archive.

The Trust’s archive brings together contemporary military documents, declassified reports, personal statements, newspaper material, survivor accounts and later historical research. The Trust notes that, where possible, documents have been checked against available archival or historical records while preserving anomalies in original documents.

Exercise Tiger Trust — Document Archive

Editorial note

This timeline deliberately does not claim to be a complete transcription of HMS Azalea‘s ship’s log.

The convoy movements are reconstructed from surviving convoy records. Individual incidents are added where there is supporting documentary evidence. The night of 28th April 1944 is reconstructed from contemporary reports, official U.S. Navy historical analysis and survivor testimony.

Where two sources give slightly different times — most notably the initial torpedo attack on LST-507 — both are retained. The contemporary report gives 0204, while the later U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command reconstruction gives approximately 0207. This difference is identified rather than silently corrected.

Similarly, personal recollections are not presented as though they were contemporary operational logs.

The objective is a history which allows the reader to see what is known, how it is known, and where the evidence becomes uncertain.

Updated: 29th September 2026.